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of anti-competitive restraints."
Seemingly, the Fourth Circuit failed to view the provision of hos-
pital services as a continuous flow of related components. This form
of analysis, used by the Supreme Court in Goldfarb, would remove
the historical label of "local activity" that the Fourth Circuit placed
on hospital services.3 1 In addition, this would allow a more realistic
examination of the jurisdictional consequences of limiting or inhibit-
ing out-of-state entry into the local hospital services market. By re-
fusing to find jurisdiction in Rex Hospital, the Fourth Circuit left
unanswered the question of whether the anti-competitive allegations
in Rex Hospital are the types of abuses which Congress sought to
guard against in drafting the Sherman Act.
EDWARD E. FISCHER, JR.
III. ATTORNEY'S FEES
Fourth Circuit Expansion of the Bad Faith Theory in Awarding
Attorney's Fees.
Under the "American rule,"' prevailing parties have traditionally
been unable to recover their attorney's fees absent express statutory
authorization2 or an enforceable contract.3 Certain exceptions to this
31 Although the case involved the Agricultural Adjustment Act, in Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the Court acknowledged the importance of viewing com-
merce in a broad context: [The effect on commerce] "taken together, with that of
many others similarly situated, is far from trivial." Id. at 128.
3, A continuing service, such as the daily operation of a hospital facility, differs
in concept from situations such as that in Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, Inc.,
332 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1964). There, the Second Circuit held that the one-time outfitting
of a bowling alley did not meet the jurisdictional requirements of the Sherman Act.
Id. at 273. In Rex Hospital, not only physical plant expansion was involved; there was
also a restraint on a proportionate increase in supportive operations that have a daily
contact with interstate commerce. See Note, Portrait of the Sherman Act as a Com-
merce Clause Statute, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 323 (1974).
' For a history of the "American rule" and a general treatment of attorney's fees,
see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-59 (1975), and
Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA.
L. REV. 636 (1974).
2 Congress has specifically authorized the award of "reasonable attorney's fees"
in certain statutes to encourage private litigants to help enforce federal laws. Fees have
been authorized in actions brought under the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, 7
U.S.C. § 210(f) (1970); the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. §
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general rule have been allowed upon various policy theories. One
theory allows courts to award attorney's fees to a litigant whose oppo-
nent has pursued a patently groundless action or defense and has
done so in bad faith.4 A second theory has been applied by courts to
award fees out of a fund recovered or maintained by the plaintiff.-
Another theory, recently invalidated by the Supreme Court,' allowed
awards to plaintiffs who acted as private attorneys general.' Of the
499g(b) (1970); antitrust law, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970); the Trust Indenture Act of 1939,
15 U.S.C. § 77www(a) (1970); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e),
78r(a) (1970); copyright law, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1970); the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970); patent law, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1970); the Servicemen's
Readjustment Act of 1958, 38 U.S.C. § 1822(b) (1970); civil rights law, 42 U.S.C. §
2000a-3(b) (1970); the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1970); the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. § 1227 (1970); the Communications Act of 1934, 47
U.S.C. § 206 (1970); and interstate commerce law, 49 U.S.C. §§ 8, 908(b) (1970).
3 See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 156 F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir. 1946).
The bad faith theory was developed in equity to punish parties for conduct
causing unnecessary delay to or additional effort by the adverse party. This theory
includes conduct meant to prolong litigation, e.g., Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494 (4th
Cir. 1963), and conduct requiring the institution of litigation, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v.
Dunham, 471 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1973). Fee shifts have also been awarded when a party
knowingly violates a clear legal duty, e.g., Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir.
1974), and in cases of outright disobedience of court orders, e.g., Toledo Scale Co. v.
Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426 (1923).
In Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1928), rev'd
on other grounds, 281 U.S. 1 (1930), the court noted that the equitable power to award
attorney's fees had originated in early English statutes and extended both to cases
involving unsustained charges of misconduct and fraud, and cases based on fabricated
charges. Id. at 241.
3 The reasoning behind the "common fund" theory provides that all who partici-
pate in the fund should pay the cost of its creation or protection. This is best achieved
by deducting attorney's fees from the fund itself. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527
(1881). A second case, Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885),
recognized the independent right of lawyers, by use of a lien, to share in the fund of
the inactive members of the class represented. See also Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973);
Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Gibbs v. Blackwelder, 346 F.2d
943 (4th Cir. 1965). For an excellent discussion of the history of the common fund
theory, see Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees From Funds, 87
HARv. L. REv. 1597 (1974).
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
If a plaintiff sued for the enforcement of rights that benefitted a large class and
vindicated congressional policy, he was entitled to a fee shift. This grant was justified
not only as a reward to the prevailing plaintiff for initiating the suit but also as an
incentive to encourage future plaintiffs to assert federal statutory rights. See Newman
v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968); Lee v. Southern Home Sites
Corp., 444 F.2d 143, 147-48 (5th Cir. 1971).
In Alyeska, the Supreme Court rejected the private attorney general theory. In
ordering Alyeska to pay half of the reasonable value of services rendered by the plain-
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two theories still in effect, the bad faith concept has received the
greater attention in recent Fourth Circuit cases.
Perhaps in response to the unavailability of the private attorney
general theory, the Fourth Circuit apparently has decided to institute
a liberal practice of shifting fees under the bad faith rationale. In
Wright v. Jackson,I the court provided a detailed test and time limit
for determining what conduct may be considered obstinate under the
bad faith theory. In so providing, however, the Fourth Circuit distin-
guished between merit-related and general obstinacy.9 If obstinate
conduct is related to the merits of a case, the court stated that the
trial court must assess attorney's fees while the merits are before it.
Thus, an award could be made either prior to an appeal or on remand.
Conversely, fees awarded for general obstinacy were held to be pro-
perly within a district court's authority to tax costs"0 even after an
tiffs' attorneys, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals applied the private attorney
general theory. Noting that the plaintiffs had acted to vindicate important statutory
rights of all citizens and had ensured that the governmental system functioned pro-
perly, the court held they were entitled to attorney's fees lest the great cost of such
litigation deter private parties desiring to see the laws protecting the environment
properly enforced. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 161 U.S. App. D.C. 446, 456, 495 F.2d
1026, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court reversed the order and concluded that
Congress' statutory authorizations of fee shifting should not be construed as a grant
of authority to the judiciary to disregard the "American rule." The circumstances
under which attorney's fees are to be awarded and the range of judicial discretion in
making the awards were held to be matters for Congress alone to determine. Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 263 (1975).
522 F.2d 955 (4th Cir. 1975). The plaintiffs in this case were prisoners who sought
revision of the rules and procedures for disciplinary proceedings at a federal reforma-
tory in Virginia. The district court awarded attorney's fees against the defendants for
two reasons: the obstinacy of the defendant prison officials, and the plaintiffs' conferral
of a public benefit, not only upon their fellow prisoners but also upon the defendants
themselves. The Fourth Circuit cited Alyeska as a ground for denying the award of fees
on a "public benefit" basis. 522 F.2d at 957. The "public benefit" language has been
interpreted as an outgrowth of both the private attorney general theory and the com-
mon fund theory. See Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees From
Funds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1597, 1612 (1974). If used in Wright as a reference to the
private attorney general theory, the Fourth Circuit correctly held that Alyeska invali-
dated the theory as a ground for the award. If used in Wright as a reference to the
common benefit theory, the court apparently found that imposing attorney's fees on
the defendant would not operate to spread the costs of litigation proportionately among
the beneficiaries. 522 F.2d at 957. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y,
421 U.S. 240, 245 n.14 (1975).
9 General obstinacy encompasses obstinate conduct related to procedural aspects
of a case, such as failure to obey court orders or to cooperate in discovery motions. See
Wright v. Jackson, 522 F.2d 955, 958 (4th Cir. 1975).
10 The court characterized the award of attorney's fees based on merit-related
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appeal is taken. In defining general obstinacy, the Fourth Circuit
included the three grounds upon which the district court had based
its award: the Wright defendants' unwillingness to conciliate; their
unsatisfactory response to the court's directions to redraft prison
rules; and their recalcitrance in carrying out the final order. All of
these were held proper grounds for fee awards based on general ob-
stinacy, but only to the extent that they occasioned delay to or unnec-
essary effort by the adverse party."
In reviewing the actual award, the Fourth Circuit found the first
ground, failure to conciliate, unsupported by the facts of the case.
Mere refusal to settle a legitimate controversy, which did not occa-
sion unnecessary effort on the part of the adverse party, was not a
basis for a fee award. 2 The Fourth Circuit also noted that if the
obstinacy as "discretionary costs" which were governed by the time test it established.
522 F.2d at 957. On the other hand, a fee shift based on general obstinacy was referred
to merely as a cost. 522 F.2d at 958. Both are valid characterizations of the broad
equitable power of federal courts to assess litigation costs. See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l
Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70 (1927);
First Nat'l Bank v. Dunham, 471 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1973); City Bank v. Rivera Davila,
438 F.2d 1367 (1st Cir. 1971); Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473, 481 (4th
Cir. 1951); In re Midland United Co*., 141 F.2d 692 (3d Cir. 1944); In re Swartz, 130
F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1942); Niday v. Graef, 279 F. 941 (9th Cir. 1922); Stacy v. Williams,
50 F.R.D. 52 (N.D. Miss. 1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 1366 (5th Cir. 1971); Gold Dust Corp.
v. Hoffenberg, 13 F. Supp. 794 (W.D.N.Y. 1936), modified on other grounds, 87 F.2d
451 (2d Cir. 1937); Gazan v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 6 F. Supp. 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1934);
Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co. v. Leman, 24 F.2d 423 (D. Mass. 1928); Parker Rust
Proof Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 23 F.2d 502 (E.D. Mich. 1928).
u Wright v. Jackson, 522 F.2d 955, 958 (4th Cir. 1975). Under this rationale, even
a prevailing party could be held liable for fees, and the Wright court readily admitted
this. Id. See McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 943 (1972).
12 522 F.2d at 958. See Lichtenstein v. Lichtenstein, 481 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1144 (1974) (attorney's fees not to be awarded when allegedly
frivolous appeal based on ambiguous agreement and law on subject not well settled);
Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corp., 468 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1972) (no fee shift merely
because of contempt citation; contempt not necessarily included under bad faith head-
ing); Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 466 F.2d 722 (7th Cir.
1972) (ambiguity of law and absence of well-defined standard of conduct for parties
foreclosed fee shift). Other circuits have awarded attorney's fees for several reasons.
See Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974) (award of fees proper when
violation of clearly established law forces plaintiff to bring unnecessary lawsuit);
Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc., 484 F.2d 905 (7th
Cir. 1973) (attorney's fees awarded in patent infringement action based on delay to
adverse party); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973) (fees
awarded where dilatory tactic of amending exhibits resulted in great delay to plain-
tiffs); Stolberg v. Members of Bd. of Trustees, 474 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973) (fees
awarded when teacher forced to bring unnecessary action to obtain offer of reinstate-
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district court had in fact based its award on this ground, the award
was improper for a second reason: the issue was actually related to
the merits, and under the time test the lower court had jurisdiction
to award fees for merit-related obstinacy only before the appeal was
taken or on remand. 3 However, the circuit court did state that if the
defendants had refused to concede genuinely undisputed issues, such
action would have been "classic" general obstinacy and not subject
to the court's time test.1 4 Refusal to comply with the final order was
held to be a valid ground for the fee shift, as was the defendants'
inadequate redrafting of rules to the extent that this inconvenienced
the plaintiffs. 5
The rationale utilized by the Wright court in awarding attorney's
fees was not altogether novel. The essential elements of unnecessary
effort or delay have been employed in prior cases both within and
without the Fourth Circuit. 6 However, the distinction between merit-
related and general obstinacy and the corresponding time test have
no precedent. The distinction may be helpful in some instances, but
situations in which its application will generate confusion are foresee-
able. In Wright, two of the grounds cited for general or procedurally-
related 7 obstinacy are not difficult to understand; refusal to obey a
court order or to redraft rules are at least arguably related to proce-
dural directives. Refusal to conciliate, however, was deemed merit-
related obstinacy when it involved one party's refusal to concede
substantive issues on which it was clearly wrong. On the other hand,
ment after dismissal for clearly unconstitutional reasons and trial prolonged by defen-
dants' extensive discovery proceedings); First Nat'l Bank v. Dunham, 471 F.2d 712
(8th Cir. 1973) (fees awarded when fraudulent and dilatory conduct of debtor forced
creditor to unnecessarily litigate and prolonged trial); Furbee v. Vantage Press, Inc.,
150 U.S. App. D.C. 326, 464 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (fees awarded when publishing
company involved in unnecessary litigation in view of unambiguous state of law as set
out in contract).
11 See Wright v. Jackson, 522 F.2d 955, 958 (4th Cir. 1975).
14 Id.
'1 Id. The Fourth Circuit contrasted the inconvenience to the parties with inconve-
nience to the court in its discussion of contempt. It stated that the obduracy of the
defendants in refusing to obey a court order, which led to a finding of contempt, would
not justify an assessment of attorney's fees for an earlier stage of the case in which no
obstinacy occurred. Id. Thus, the court recognized that acts of contempt should not
necessarily result in fee shifting. Contemptuous conduct carries its own penalties, and
the court, in establishing its test, apparently determined that an award of attorney's
fees was not a proper penalty for such behavior.
" See Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 949 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
892 (1972); Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494, 500 (4th Cir. 1963); Woolfolk v. Brown,
358 F. Supp. 524, 535 (E.D. Va. 1973). For cases from other circuits, see note 12 supra.
'7 See note 9 supra.
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the court considered the conduct general obstinacy when one party
refused to concede matters about which "there can be no legitimate
dispute."'8 Because there is often no clear division between instances
in which one party is in error and those in which there can be no
legitimate dispute, the court's distinction may prove too difficult to
employ. Courts will have to decide how clearly erroneous one party
must be in his interpretation of the law before refusal to conciliate
becomes a refusal to concede matters about which there can be no
legitimate dispute, and thus general obstinacy.
Because of the inevitable confusion regarding the distinction be-
tween general and merit-related obstinacy, the Wright time test may
be rendered invalid. Courts may hesitate to hold that obstinacy is
merit-related if they can foresee a necessity to award attorney's fees
after an appeal is taken, especially if they have reason to doubt that
the case will come before them again on remand. 9 Furthermore, a
court may be unable to separate its assessments of attorney's fees
accurately under general and merit-related obstinacy headings.
Thus, it would probably classify all obstinacy as procedure-related
and thereby retain its power to assess fees after an appeal as a means
of taxing costs.
Another recent Fourth Circuit case addressing the bad faith
theory was McCrary v. Runyon.2" McCrary involved an action for
deprivation of civil rights' brought by parents of black children who
were allegedly denied admission to private schools solely on the basis
of their race. The Fourth Circuit reversed the award of attorney's fees
against the two private school defendants, holding that no federal
statute authorized the award" and that the bad faith theory did not
apply. In discussing the bad faith theory, the court noted that be-
cause the lawsuit involved the application of a recently revived stat-
ute,2 the standard of conduct expected of the schools was unclear.
" 522 F.2d at 958.
" Wright held that insofar as a court's measure of a party's obstinacy depends
upon the merits, the court must make the assessment while the merits are before it.
Id. See text accompanying notes 8-9 supra.
20 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3271 (U.S. November 11,
1975) (No. 75-306), aff'g in part and rev'g in part Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School,
Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973).
21 The action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
21 515 F.2d at 1090. Although the Emergency School Aid Act expressly allows fees,
20 U.S.C. § 1617 (Supp. 11, 1973), the court held that law inapplicable because the
schools involved had not received state or federal aid. 515 F.2d at 1090.
= 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) originated in the 1866 and 1870 Civil Rights Act. In
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), this act was revived and given an
expansive reading.
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Moreover, although the schools' conduct was held improper, it did
not reflect the willful and persistent defiance of the law contemplated
by the Fourth Circuit in its previous decisions. 2 Mere faults in per-
ception or memory which resulted in different versions of the facts
were held insufficient grounds to shift the expense of litigation,25 and
the court found no other basis for a bad faith award. 2
The distinction between merit-related and general obstinacy, and
the corresponding time test utilized in Wright, would be inapplicable
in McCrary because no finding of obdurate obstinacy was made. 7
The McCrary decision, however, does refine one of the grounds for a
finding of obstinacy discussed in Wright-the refusal to conciliate.
Since the effect of the civil rights statutes on private discrimination
was unsettled,28 there was no well-defined standard of conduct for the
schools to follow either in their admission policies or in the ensuing
litigation. Thus, the defendants had a legitimate reason to believe
that their conduct was within the law, and under the circumstances
a finding of bad faith was considered inappropriate. 29 McCrary, then,
24 See, e.g., Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494, 497-98 (4th Cir. 1963) (chronic use
of patently evasive and obstructive tactics by public school officials to prevent school
desegregation resulted in award of attorney's fees).
515 F.2d at 1090. The plaintiffs testified that they were told over the telephone
by one of the defendants that the Fairfax-Brewster School was not integrated. The
defendant denied that the telephone conversation took place and claimed that the
plaintiff's application was rejected for "insufficient preparation for the first grade" at
Fairfax-Brewster. Similarly, the superintendent of Bobbe's School denied ever telling
the plaintiffs that the school accepted only whites. Id. at 1084-85.
28 Id. at 1089 n.6. The Fourth Circuit refused to apply the private attorney general
theory to this case because the action was based on the older civil rights statutes, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1970). The court required more recent congressional determina-
tion that the policy underlying these statutes was so important, or public enforcement
mechanisms so ineffective, that attorney's fees were necessary to promote private
enforcement. Mere provision for a private cause of action was held insufficient to
justify awarding attorney's fees. The court stated that the least it would require was a
statutory grant of such fees in suits covering the same subject matter. 515 F.2d at 1090.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit was unwilling to allow utilization of the private attorney
general theory on reasoning similar to the Supreme Court's later decision in Alyeska.
See note 7 supra for discussion of Alyeska.
1 Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973).
The district court found that the defendants had not "acted recklessly or wilfully in
disregard of clear existing law." Id. at 1205 n.5.
2 See Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the
Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. Rv. 449
(1974); Note, Desegregation of Private Schools: Section 1981 as an Alternative to State
Action, 62 GEo. L.J. 1363 (1974); Note, Section 1981 and Private Groups: The Right
to Discriminate Versus Freedom from Discrimination, 84 YALE L.J. 1441 (1975).
219 515 F.2d at 1089 & n.6.
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limits a party's refusal to conciliate as a basis for a fee award to those
situations in which the law may be considered well settled. A reasona-
ble effort to interpret a statute of uncertain effect, although erroneous
and instigating prolonged litigation, will apparently not result in a
finding of bad faith in the Fourth Circuit.
The Wright distinction and time test are also inapplicable to an-
other recent Fourth Circuit decision, Hallmark Clinic v. North Caro-
lina Department of Human Resources.30 In Hallmark, an abortion
clinic and its proprietor successfully sought an injunction3' restrain-
ing the enforcement of a state regulation requiring non-hospital-
affiliated abortion clinics to arrange for emergency transfers with the
nearest hospital. The plaintiffs appealed the district court's refusal
to grant attorney's fees, 32 contending that the defendants had acted
in bad faith in interpreting Roe v. Wade3 and Doe v. Bolton 4 as
30 519 F.2d 1315 (4th Cir. 1975).
31 The injunction was sought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
32 Hallmark Clinic v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 380 F. Supp.
1153, 1159-60 (E.D.N.C. 1974).
410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe held that state criminal abortion laws that excepted
from criminality only a life-saving procedure on the mother's behalf without regard to
the stage of her pregnancy violated the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The state was held to have legitimate interests in protecting both the pregnant
woman's health and the potentiality of human life beyond the first trimester of preg-
nancy, but during the first trimester, the abortion decision was to be left up to the
mother and her physician. Id. at 163-64.
410 U.S. 179 (1973). In Doe, the Supreme Court held that the state's interest
in health protection and the existence of a potential human life justified regulation of
the manner of performing the abortion. The Court also held, however, that a state law
requiring the performance of abortions only in accredited hospitals was unconstitu-
tional because the state had not shown that only hospitals satisfied the interest in fully
protecting the patient. Id. at 195.
The North Carolina legislature responded to Roe and Doe by enacting a new
abortion statute. While it retained criminal penalties for the performance or procure-
ment of abortions, the statute provided for legal abortions during the first trimester of
pregnancy if performed by physicians licensed to practice in North Carolina and in
hospitals or clinics certified by the Department of Human Resources. Hallmark Clinic
v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 380 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (E.D.N.C.
1974). The plaintiffs in Hallmark claimed that the regulation enacted pursuant to the
new statute requiring that the doctor running an abortion clinic be on the active staff
at a hospital within 15 minutes travel time from the clinic constituted unreasonable
bad faith conduct. By conditioning the clinic certification on a transfer agreement and
the status of a doctor in a hospital, the state had violated fundamental due process.
The hospital could decide to sign transfer agreements and grant staff privileges com-
pletely arbitrarily. The plaintiffs argued that the state's refusal to comply with Roe
and Doe was bad faith conduct which required them to force comjliance through
litigation. Id. at 1159.
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mandates for the enacted regulation.35 Further, the plaintiffs re-
quested attorney's fees because they believed that they had been
unnecessarily compelled to instigate litigation in order to force com-
pliance with the law as set forth in Roe. The Fourth Circuit held the
bad faith rationale inapplicable because the state officials had made
a reasonable, realistic effort to implement state laws responsive to
new constitutional doctrine.36 The court considered a fee award in
such a situation unfair and an abuse of its equitable discretion. Al-
though the Hallmark court admitted that the defendants were unso-
phisticated in their interpretation of the right of privacy, it found
neither malicious intent nor willful and persistent defiance of the law
in the enactment of the regulation.
3 7
As in McCrary, the Wright test is inapplicable here because of the
court's failure to find obstinate conduct on the part of the defendants.
Hallmark is significant, however, because the Fourth Circuit intro-
duced an additional ground which may sustain an award of attorney's
fees under the bad faith theory. Although unavailable in Hallmark,
a state's bad faith conduct in enacting an improper and unconstitu-
tional regulation may support a fee shift. As in McCrary, the enact-
ment must be irrational and unreasonable with regard to well-
established law. The bad faith theory would apply under such cir-
cumstances because the plaintiff is forced to institute otherwise un-
necessary litigation to rectify the state's patently illegal act.
The final Fourth Circuit case dealing with the bad faith theory
was Thonen v. Jenkins,35 a suit alleging deprivation of first amend-
ment rights under color of state law. 9 The issue in Thonen was the
propriety of the district court's grant of attorney's fees for the defen-
dants' "unreasonable" conduct." The lower court had based its
award in part4 on the bad faith theory, holding that the conduct of
The plaintiffs also sought an award of attorney's fees under the private attorney
general theory, claiming that they had vindicated the rights of North Carolina women
to obtain first-trimester abortions free from state interference. Relying on Alyeska, the
Fourth Circuit rejected the claim because no congressional statute supported a fee shift
under the circumstances of this case. 519 F.2d at 1317.
Id. at 1316, 1317.
Id. at 1317.
38 517 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1975).
31 The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The plaintiffs were two
state university students who had been disciplined by the defendant university offi-
cials for a letter they had published in the school newspaper. 517 F.2d at 5.
40 517 F.2d at 6.
4 The district court also based the fee shift on the private attorney general theory,
holding that the plaintiffs had acted to secure the first amendment rights of all univer-
sity students against similar infringement and thereby vindicated the congressional
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the defendant state university officials and their counsel, before and
during the litigation, constituted obdurate obstinacy. 2 Specifically,
the defendants had punished the plaintiffs for language which others
had used without reprimand, and had disciplined the plaintiffs al-
though their language did not cause a disruptive effect on campus.
The Fourth Circuit considered this conduct unreasonable and there-
fore in bad faith. 3 The court additionally found that the defendants
had continually refused to compromise and had thereby delayed the
action and required unnecessary effort by the plaintiffs. The Thonen
court cited two specific instances of unreasonable litigation tactics:
appeal of a consent order defendants themselves had suggested, and
insistence on a clearly untenable procedural position causing plain-
tiffs an unnecessary trip to the judge's chambers."
The three examples of obstinate conduct cited in Thonen illus-
trate both of the categories of obstinacy established by the Fourth
Circuit in Wright. The two examples of defendants' unreasonable
litigation tactics may be classified as general obstinacy because they
are related to court procedure.15 The defendants' unreasonableness in
disciplining the students, however, must be considered a bad faith
award in the category of merit-related obstinacy"6 because it goes to
the very essence of the lawsuit. Unlike Hallmark, the Thonen defen-
dant state officials had violated a clear legal duty not to infringe the
plaintiffs' fundamental constitutional rights. Thus, this part of the
court's measure of obstinacy depended upon the merits of the case
and must be characterized as merit-related obstinacy under the
Wright test. In this sense, Thonen is noteworthy as the only case of
the four recognizing a violation of well settled law as a ground for bad
policy against denial of § 1983 rights. See 517 F.2d at 6. The Fourth Circuit did not
discuss the private attorney general claim. Since no statute authorized an award of
attorney's fees, the Alyeska ruling rendered the claim invalid. See note 7 supra.
"1 517 F.2d at 6. Although the court did not define this term, it has been under-
stood to mean willful and persistent defiance of the law. See Brewer v. School Bd.,
456 F.2d 943, 949 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 892 (1972).
11 517 F.2d at 6. As a result of this finding, the court held the defendants liable in
their individual capacities. The court did not find, however, that the defendants'
actions were malicious. Id. at 6. The Fourth Circuit appears to be expanding the
concept of obdurate obstinacy as defined in Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 948-
52 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 892 (1972), to include conduct lacking the element
of willfulness or malice. Seemingly, courts in the Fourth Circuit may now award
attorney's fees for non-willful, non-malicious conduct that is merely found to be
unreasonable.
" 517 F.2d at 7.
" See note 9 supra.
' See note 10 supra.
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faith. However, the proper classification of the defendants' obstinate
conduct as general or merit-related made no difference in Thonen
because the district court assessed the fee award while the case was
before it, a procedure acceptable under both of the categories estab-
lished in Wright. Thus, the obstinacy categories and corresponding
time test of the Wright decision remain of uncertain value in the
Fourth Circuit. 7
However, the bad faith theory was not the Fourth Circuit's only
concern in Thonen. The court was also required to determine the
equally important issue of whether the defendants could be assessed
attorney's fees consistently with the eleventh amendment.48 Since
" The Thonen decision also resembles Hallmark in that the bad faith of the
defendants was the sole reason that the plaintiffs had to instigate suit. It is this act of
forcing unnecessary litigation that activates the Wright keystone of unnecessary effort
as a ground for a fee award under bad faith. The reason that the Fourth Circuit found
bad faith in Thonen but not in Hallmark appears to depend upon how well settled the
law was in each case. Because the constitutional doctrine to be followed in Hallmark
had only recently been expounded by-the Supreme Court and there were few subse-
quent cases interpreting that doctrine, the Fourth Circuit indicated that a finding of
bad faith would be unjust. 519 F.2d at 1317. There was no clear duty for the defendants
to follow in that case. However, the plaintiffs in Thonen were unquestionably denied
their well-established first amendment rights of freedom of speech as protected under
§ 1983. See 517 F.2d at 6.
"U.S. COsT. amend. XI provides in pertinent part:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State ....
Id.
States are also accorded immunity from suits brought by their own citizens. Hans
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme
Court provided that state officials could be sued as individuals by holding that such
officers might be enjoined as individuals from enforcing unconstitutional state law. Id.
at 159-60. Operating under the fiction that the state was not being sued, the Court
avoided the eleventh amendment prohibition. See Note, Attorneys' Fees and the Elev-
enth Amendment, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1875, 1879 (1975). The Court has refused, however,
to extend this fiction to damage awards against state officials, recognizing instead that
the state is the real party in interest and that an award would have to be paid from
state funds. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573 (1946); Ford
Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945); Great N. Life Ins. Co.
v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
A number of cases have discussed the permissibility of awards of attorney's fees
directly against state governments rather than against state officials in light of judicial
interpretation of the eleventh amendment as set forth in Ford Motor Co. v. Depart-
ment of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945). See Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137 (1st
Cir. 1975); Class v. Norton, 505 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1974); Brandenburger v. Thompson,
494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974); Gates v. Collier, 489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd on
rehearing, 501 F.2d 1291 (1974).
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Edelman v. Jordan,9 fee awards against state officials have been
characterized as damages and have been closely examined under the
eleventh amendment prohibition of damage awards against a state. 0
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit held that Edelman did not overrule
Sims v. Amos,5 in which the Supreme Court summarily affirmed an
award of attorney's fees in a civil rights action against state execu-
tives and legislators in their official capacities.2 Thus, the Thonen
Since Alyeska, see note 6 supra, the Supreme Court has- disposed of several of
these cases without considering the effect of the eleventh amendment on fee awards.
Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 982
(1975); Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974), vacated on other
grounds, 421 U.S. 983 (1975); Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); Named Individual Members v. Texas Highway Dep't, 496
F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 926 (1975); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp.
691 (M.D. Ala.) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 942 (1972). Cf. Boston Chapter,
NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975), in
which the award of costs of appeal against a state was held permissible notwithstand-
ing the eleventh amendment. Id. at 1029. See Note, Attorneys' Fees and the Eleventh
Amendment, 88 HAiv. L. Rxv. 1875 (1975); Comment, Federal Powers and the Elev-
enth Amendment: Attorneys' Fees in Private Suits Against the State, 63 CALIF. L. REV.
1167 (1975).
Hallmark also dealt with the eleventh amendment, and the Fourth Circuit held
that a fee award against the Department of Human Resources, a major executive
branch of the state government would violate the eleventh amendment prohibition of
awards against a state. Hallmark Clinic v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources,
519 F.2d 1315, 1317 (4th Cir. 1975). The district court had suggested that awards of
fees against officials as individuals would violate the eleventh amendment if the state
was expected to reimburse the officials or to pay the judgement for them. Hallmark
Clinic v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 380 F. Supp. 1153, 1159-60 & n.12
(E.D.N.C. 1974).
4' 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The Supreme Court held that an award of retroactive
welfare payments to be paid from state funds was equivalent to a legal recovery of
damages and thus was conclusively barred by the eleventh amendment. Id. at 668.
1o See, e.g., Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated on other
grounds, 421 U.S. 982 (1975); Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975).
51 409 U.S. 942 (1972). The Supreme Court in Alyeska noted that its summary
affirmance of Sims was not to be taken as an acceptance of the judicially-created
private attorney general rule. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S.
240, 270-71 n.46 (1975). Yet the district court in Sims had also based its award of fees
on the bad faith of the defendants. Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 693-94 (M.D. Ala.)
(per curiam), aff'd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972). Thus, the language in Alyeska could be
interpreted as an approval by the Supreme Court of awards for obstinate conduct
against state officials in their official capacities. However, the Court specifically re-
served the question of the propriety of fee awards directly against states elsewhere in
the opinion. 421 U.S. at 269 n.44.
52 The Sims district court noted that a reapportionment action would have been
unnecessary had it not been for the legislature's recalcitrance in responding to a consti-
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court read Edelman to proscribe only damages and retroactive bene-
fit awards against a state in a private suit. Consequently, the court
determined that it had sufficient authority to make the award against
the defendants in their official capacities under its equitable power
to tax costs of litigation.53
By characterizing attorney's fees as costs of litigation, the Fourth
Circuit seemingly avoided the eleventh amendment issue. However,
the Supreme Court has not yet directly decided whether the eleventh
amendment would bar an award of attorney's fees from state funds.54
Therefore, it may be possible to justify fee awards against state offi-
cials by analogizing attorney's fees to costs. Fee awards may be con-
sidered a necessary cost of obtaining prospective relief and therefore
constitutional under Edelman.5 Such an approach was taken re-
cently by the Second Circuit in Class v. Norton.5" In Class, the court
approved the award of attorney's fees from state funds to reimburse
plaintiffs for their effort and' expense in enforcing compliance with a
court order from a previous trial which the state officials in bad faith
had not obeyed.57 The Second Circuit analogized the financial burden
tutional mandate. Furthermore, the other state officials could be held liable under the
bad faith exception for submitting patently unacceptable plans which added to the
expense of litigation. Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 694 (M.D. Ala.) (per curiam),
aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
13 517 F.2d at 7.
11 It appears, however, that the Court may directly address this issue in the near
future. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 519 F.2d 559 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3354
(U.S. Dec. 16, 1975) (No. 75-283), the Second Circuit held that an award of attorney's
fees against a state was a permissible ancillary effect of plaintiffs' efforts to achieve
future state compliance with federal law. 519 F.2d at 571. The court distinguished
between claims for retroactive damages against a state, which were held barred by the
eleventh amendment, and attorney's fees, which were a necessary part of the permissi-
ble claim for prospective, injunctive relief. Id. At the trial level, the plaintiffs had
successfully enjoined enforcement of a Connecticut retirement plan for state employees
which was sexually discriminatory. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 390 F. Supp. 278, 290 (D.
Conn. 1974). The district court had refused to grant attorney's fees against the state,
likening such action to an award of monetary damages forbidden by the eleventh
amendment. 390 F. Supp. at 289. The holding on attorney's fees was reversed on
appeal. 519 F.2d at 563.
11 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908).
56 505 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1974).
57 Id. at 124-25. At the trial level, the district court decreed that the state's welfare
commissioner must comply with federal regulations concerning the processing of wel-
fare applications. The state welfare department did not comply with this decree, and
plaintiffs requested that the district court issue a contempt citation. Although the
district court did not hold the welfare commissioner in contempt; it did award plain-
tiffs $1,000 in attorney's fees to cover the expenses incurred in seeking compliance with
the initial decree.
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created by the fee shift to one arising from compliance with a prospec-
tive court decree. Court-ordered prospective expenditures had been
permitted by the Edelman Court as inevitable consequences of com-
pliance with valid decrees. 58 The Class court concluded that the fee
award was similarly permissible as a necessary result of attempts to
gain compliance with a decree which by its terms was prospective in
nature. 9
The focus in Class on attorney's fees as a means of achieving
future compliance with federal law seems compatible with the
Edelman holding. Edelman implicitly recognized the importance of
the power of federal courts to insure future compliance by the states."
It would seem consistent with this emphasis on future compliance to
impose on the state not only the cost of that compliance, but also the
costs of achieving it." Such analysis would be applicable to the award
in Thonen. The relief accorded in Thonen was prospective in nature
because it required the future readmission of the plaintiffs to the
university and the clearing of their academic records. 2 Awarding
attorney's fees in conjunction with such relief appears justifiable as
a means of securing both present and future compliance with federal
constitutional law. Under this rationale, the merit-related obstinacy
of the defendant state officials, which forced the plaintiffs to bring
an unnecessary lawsuit, should be a valid ground for shifting fees.
56 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974).
1' 505 F.2d at 127, quoting Rodriguez v. Swank, 496 F.2d 1110, 1113 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974). The district court in Rodriguez had issued an injunc-
tion requiring the state to pay $100 to each applicant to the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children Program whose application was not properly processed in the
future. This order was made in response to problems in securing the compliance of
state welfare officials with a prior order requiring processing of applications within 30
days. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that in cases of noncompliance, the second
order may have greater fiscal impact on the state than the original order alone. How-
ever, this was held not to render the second order invalid. The eleventh amendment
was declared not to bar payment of state funds as a necessary consequence of future
compliance with a substantive federal question determination. Id. at 1112.
60 See 415 U.S. at 668.
62 It may even be possible to define present compliance with federal law, which
courts undoubtedly have the power to compel, to include an obligation to make repara-
tion for past violations. See Burrell v. Norton, 381 F. Supp. 339, 345 n.15 (D. Conn.
1974). But see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
62 The similarity of the injunctive order in Class and the relief requested in
Thonen should be noted. Both required the commission of some positive act in the
future. See Class v. Norton, 505 F.2d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 1974). Thus it would seem that
if the order in Class is deemed "prospective in nature" and therefore immune from
eleventh amendment prohibitions, the relief issued in Thonen should be considered
prospective as well.
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Moreover, such an award would not appear to be the kind of
retroactive relief prohibited by the Edelman Court. The majority in
Edelman recognized the similarity of retroactive relief and dam-
ages;"3 the award was a form of compensation measured in terms of a
monetary loss resulting from a past breach of a legal duty on the part
of the defendant state officials. 4 Awards of attorney's fees arguably
do not come within this definition. Although they do reimburse liti-
gants for past expenses incurred as a result of officials' prior actions,
they are unlike damages in certain respects. They do not compensate
for injuries sustained by the plaintiff, but reimburse him for expenses
incurred in the process of obtaining a remedy." Also, even if
attorney's fees are regarded as compensation for prior losses, these
losses arise in the course of obtaining prospective relief and thus,
unlike damages, may be considered an unavoidable financial burden
created by the process of adjusting future state policy to the demands
of federal law."
In further support of its conclusion, the Thonen court cited
Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota,7 in which the Supreme Court
awarded costs of litigation directly against the State of Minnesota in
a criminal appeal." Fairmont, however, may not be strong precedent
here. The eleventh amendment was not discussed in Fairmont, and
the case involved conventional court costs rather than attorney's
fees.69 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit's intimation that attorney's fees
415 U.S. at 668.
64 Id.
Indeed, attorney's fees may be awarded in cases in which injury has merely been
threatened. See, e.g., La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd,
488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974).
66 Note, Attorneys' Fees and the Eleventh Amendment, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1875,
1896 (1975); see Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1029 (1st Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).
67 275 U.S. 70 (1927).
Is The Supreme Court reasoned that the state "lost" its sovereignty when it initi-
ated litigation before the Court. 275 U.S. 70, 74 (1927). Citing Fairmont Creamery,
federal courts have also asserted a power to tax costs against state officials in their
official capacity, even in litigation not initiated by the state. See Boston Chapter,
NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1028-29 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910
(1975); Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 1974) (dictum), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 991 (1975). The Supreme Court, however, has never ruled on the question of the
lower courts' power to tax costs or on the propriety of taxing costs against the state
when it is a defendant.
62 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1970) defines court costs as including the fees of the clerk or
marshal, the fees of the court reporter for the stenographic transcript used in the case,
fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses, fees for copying papers used in the
case, and docket fees as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1923 (1970). 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1970).
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are "incidents of the hearing" 7 is a novel approach,7' especially since
the Fairmont Court failed to state specifically what items constituted
such incidents. 2
Fairmont nonetheless may be considered as supporting the power
to award attorney's fees against the states. By imposing a monetary
liability on an unconsenting state, the Supreme Court appeared to
reject a claim of sovereign immunity, which is the basis for the elev-
enth amendment." This suggests that the eleventh amendment im-
munity of states appearing in federal court may .be limited by the
inherent authority of the court to make orders to insure the orderly
administration of justice.7 Under this rationale, attorney's fees may
be viewed as judicial costs of insuring such orderly administration.
A federal court should have enough control over the behavior of the
parties to insure that litigation will proceed in an orderly manner.
Consequently, the courts have broad powers to achieve this objec-
tive.7 5 The bad faith theory would support a characterization of fees
as costs under the rationale of a court having power over its proce-
275 U.S. at 77. See 517 F.2d at 7.
" See Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1975), in which the First Circuit
noted in dictum that an award of attorney's fees to be paid with state funds was
permissible because such awards were comparable to court costs incidental to litiga-
tion properly before federal courts. Id. at 1140. The award of attorney's fees was based
on the private attorney general theory, but the First Circuit also discussed the similari-
ties of attorney's fees to costs, which had been held taxable against a state in Boston
Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910
(1975). Like costs, attorney's fees were part of the litigation expense deemed recovera-
ble by the successful party or attorney. Both costs and attorney's fees were found to
be in the same incidental relationship to the main litigation and thus, the court held
that both should be considered together. The First Circuit accordingly concluded that
attorney's fees, like costs, were not barred by the eleventh amendment. 512 F.2d at
1140. To the extent state officials are amenable to suits in the federal courts, they
should be responsible for costs and fees incidental to the main litigation to the same
degree as other litigants. Id.
72 The Fairmont Court reasoned that if it had jurisdiction to hear the case, the
incidents of the hearing would be those which attached to the regular jurisdiction of
the Court. 275 U.S. at 77. Such incidents would therefore include the power to tax
costs. See Note, Attorneys'Fees and the Eleventh Amendment, 88 HARv. L. Rav. 1875,
1890 (1975).
" See Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 990 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds
sub noma. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
71 Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70, 74 (1927). See Note,
Attorneys' Fees and the Eleventh Amendment, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1875, 1891-93 (1975).
7' Note, Attorneys' Fees and the Eleventh Amendment, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1875,
1892 (1975). For example, 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970) provides courts with summary con-
tempt power against parties and the power to punish officers of the court by fines or
imprisonment. Id.
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dures. The power to shift fees from a party who encounters bad faith
in his opponent's conduct of the litigation is an important means of
controlling the trial process." Parties who prolong litigation and in-
crease its costs in a deliberate attempt to drain the financial resources
of their opponents threaten the court's very effectiveness as a forum.
Regardless of the limits the eleventh amendment may place on the
substantive relief to be granted against states, it seems that courts
should be allowed to retain control over the litigation even when
states or their officials are parties. Furthermore, the likelihood of
obtaining a fee award serves both to encourage the plaintiffs to con-
tinue despite bad faith opposition and to discourage defendants from
acting obstinately. As the prospective relief rationale supports a char-
acterization of attorney's fees for merit-related obstinacy as costs, the
theory of preserving order within the judicial system supports a char-
acterization of fees for general obstinacy as costs. The theory of pre-
serving judicial order concerns procedural rules and directives which
are the subjects of general obstinacy.
7
Aptly characterized as costs, fee awards against state officials
should not be subject to eleventh amendment prohibitions as the
Fourth Circuit indicated in Thonen.75 The court could have found
further support for this holding by focusing on the "ancillary effect
' 79
on state funds as a means of avoiding Edelman. The Court in
16 See Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 872 (1929). This theory finds support in
Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 942
(1972), in which the district court awarded attorney's fees against state officials in their
official capacities. The court based its award in part on the procedurally-related bad
faith of the defendant officials in submitting "obviously unacceptable" reapportion-
ment plans which contributed to the expense and delay of the litigation. Id. at 694.
See notes 51 and 52 supra.
17 Regardless of whether one characterizes the obstinacy as merit-related or gen-
eral, there are cases inexplicably ignored by the Fourth Circuit which seem to dispose
of any doubt about the validity of the fee shift in Thonen. In Stolberg v. Members of
Bd. of Trustees, 474 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973), the Second Circuit noted that attorney's
fees could properly be awarded to assure that the plaintiff would not be forced to great
expense to vindicate clearly-held first amendment rights and thereby be deterred from
obtaining such vindication by the prospect of costly, protracted proceedings necessary
only because of the defendants' obstinate conduct. Id. at 490. Further support for the
holding in Thonen exists in Bradley v. School Bd., 345 F.2d 310 (4th Cir.), vacated on
other grounds, 382 U.S. 103 (1965). In Bradley, the Fourth Circuit held that attorney's
fees could be awarded in cases in which litigation was unnecessary and was compelled
solely by obdurate obstinacy. Id. at 321.
11 See Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70, 77 (1927); Sims v. Amos,
340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 942 (1972); notes 68
and 71 supra.
" See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974).
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
Edelman noted that ancillary drains on state treasuries were not
prohibited by the eleventh amendment. It held that such effects re-
sulted when state officials would more likely have to spend money
from the state treasury to shape their official conduct to a court order
than if they were left free to pursue their previous course of conduct."
The fiscal consequences arising from state officials' efforts to conform
to a court's prospective decrees would be deemed ancillary and per-
missible.8 ' In Class, the Second Circuit followed this principle in
awarding attorney's fees. The court stated that the fees were analyti-
cally indistinguishable from a cost award and had an ancillary effect
on the state treasury because they were incident to an order granting
prospective, injunctive relief." Thus, the award in Thonen may justi-
fiably be considered incident to an order granting prospective relief.
Consequently, the effect on the state treasury may be considered
ancillary. In addition, the amount of the award, approximately
$3,500, would not be impermissible for creating fiscal disruption in
the state's budget."
In summary, Wright indicates that future litigants in the Fourth
Circuit may expect to receive awards of attorney's fees under the bad
faith theory if their opponent's obstinate conduct causes them unnec-
essary effort or undue delay. Under the time test established in
Wright, litigants may also expect possible fee awards from district
courts even after appeals have been taken, if the obstinate conduct
can be characterized as general. The time test and grounds for obstin-
acy established in Wright will no doubt be valuable in determining
future assessments for attorney's fees under the bad faith theory.
However, there will be many cases, like Hallmark and McCrary, in
which the Wright principles have no relevance because of the absence
of obstinate conduct. The Fourth Circuit will probably continue to
use Wright for the specific grounds it utilized in granting attorney's
fees: causing delay to or unnecessary effort on the part of adverse
parties. Beyond this, however, Wright will have little applicability
0Id.
" Id. at 667-68.
82 Class v. Norton, 505 F.2d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 1974). See Jordan v. Fusari, 496 F.2d
646, 651 (2d Cir. 1974); Rodriguez v. Swank, 496 F.2d 1110, 1113 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
" The Edelman opinion implied that the extent of an award's impact on the fiscal
planning of a state would go to determining its constitutionality, although the Court
suggested no standards for evaluating the varying degrees of impact. See Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 666 n.11 (1974); Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 993-94 (7th Cir.
1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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